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InTRoDUCTIon
In recent years, Americans have grown increasingly concerned about the threat of “homegrown” terrorist attacks. 
Most notably, the near-detonation of a car bomb in Times Square in 2010 raised alarms that the next phase in 
terrorism would be directed by Americans, at Americans, in America. Government at all levels has stepped up 
efforts to prevent such violence. 
As part of this drive, government officials have sought to understand “radicalization,” which they define as the 
process by which American citizens and residents turn to violence, using Islam as an ideological or religious jus-
tification.1 They hope that by understanding radicalization, they can identify homegrown terrorists before they 
strike.2 Combating radicalization is now a specific goal of the National Security Policy articulated by President 
Barack Obama.3 In Congress, the new chair of the House Homeland Security Committee has launched hearings 
on the subject.4
Officials and experts divide sharply on the extent of the threat posed by homegrown terrorism. The Intelligence 
Community has traditionally judged the threat to be limited. Local law enforcement agencies and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), on the other hand, have suggested it is more widespread. The consensus within 
government, however, is that the homegrown threat demands attention. Myriad federal and state agencies have 
devoted extensive resources to studying radicalization and designing a response. 
Radicalization is complex. Yet a thinly-sourced, reductionist view of how people become terrorists has gained 
unwarranted legitimacy in some counterterrorism circles. This view corresponds with—and seems to legitimize—
“counter-radicalization” measures that rely heavily on non-threat-based intelligence collection, a tactic that may 
be ineffective or even counterproductive. Only by analyzing what we know about radicalization and the govern-
ment’s response to it can we be sure that these reactions are grounded in fact rather than stereotypes and truly 
advance our efforts to combat terrorism.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) are the 
federal government’s lead agencies to combat radicalization.5 These expert agencies have made public statements 
that recognize the complexity of the radicalization process. But they have not expressly repudiated theories sug-
gesting that it is possible to detect radicalization long before people take concrete steps toward violence. Nor have 
they proposed a unified set of responses that take account of the difficulty of combating radicalization without 
impinging on the Constitution.6 
Domestic law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and state and local police departments,7 have stepped into 
the breach. They have developed simplistic theories of how American Muslims become radicalized. These theories 
suggest, contrary to empirical social science studies, that the path to terrorism has a fixed trajectory and that each 
step of the process has specific, identifiable markers. They imply that by closely monitoring the communities 
deemed susceptible to radicalization, law enforcement officials can spot nascent terrorists and prevent future 
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attacks. Since the markers of radicalization they identify are inex-
tricably linked to Muslim religious behavior, these theories justify 
broad monitoring of American Muslim communities,8 including 
in their places of worship. Indeed, the theories are characterized 
by the view that there is a sort of “religious conveyor belt” that 
leads from grievance or personal crisis to religiosity to the adop-
tion of radical beliefs to terrorism, with each step along that con-
tinuum identifiable to law enforcement officials who know how 
to recognize the signs. 
Although the “religious conveyor belt” theory has not been adopted by the Intelligence Community, its influence 
is evident. In addition to the FBI and state and local law enforcement agencies,9 the Senate Committee on Home-
land Security and Governmental Affairs has embraced the theory.10 Moreover, the broad intelligence gathering in 
and about American Muslim communities that the theory supports is becoming increasingly evident. To be sure, 
it is hard to untangle intelligence gathering driven by fear of radicalization from the overall post-9/11 expansion 
of intelligence operations. But radicalization concerns seem to be directly connected to the expansion of certain 
aspects of the FBI’s domestic intelligence mandate and the way in which it is carried out.11 For example, changes 
to the FBI’s mandate implemented by former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, and the FBI’s internal rules, 
encourage the Bureau to gather information about social, religious, and political patterns.12 There are reports that 
the FBI has used this authority to collect, with no predicate in suspicious activity or behavior, information about 
whether “radicalization” is occurring in American Muslim communities.13 
More generally, the accepted understanding of how someone becomes a terrorist influences the selection of in-
vestigative techniques. For example, the assumed link between religiosity and terrorism encourages intrusion into 
mosques, traditionally considered off-limits to the government absent a specific connection to suspected criminal 
or terrorist activity. Reports have emerged that the FBI has infiltrated mosques simply to learn about what was 
being said by the imam leading prayers and by those attending.14 
  
This emphasis on intelligence collection about radicalization, much of which involves First Amendment-protect-
ed speech and activities, has undermined another much-touted prong of the government’s strategy—the attempt 
to engage American Muslim communities in the fight against terrorism. Many American Muslims believe their 
communities are treated as inherently suspicious by the government.15 As a result, while American Muslim com-
munities have been invaluable partners in the government’s counterterrorism efforts, some American Muslims 
are becoming more guarded in their relations with law enforcement agencies. The obvious tension between the 
government’s various responses to radicalization is increasingly noted,16 but remains unaddressed: Can a commu-
nity simultaneously be treated as suspect and also be expected to function as a partner?
 
To be sure, intelligence collection often is vital to fighting terrorism. But the blunderbuss intelligence collection 
response to radicalization poses real questions. Is our understanding of radicalization so complete that we can 
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detect incipient terrorists and stop them before they take overt steps toward violence? Is the “religious conveyor 
belt” theory, and the hallmarks of radicalization it identifies, supported by empirical evidence or does this theory 
simply reflect religious stereotypes? Is broad intelligence collection about American Muslims the appropriate 
response to the threat posed by radicalization? Or is targeted intelligence collection and normal police work a bet-
ter response? How do we grapple with the fact that an expansive approach to intelligence gathering results in the 
monitoring of protected First Amendment activity and may well chill American Muslims’ free speech, association, 
and free exercise rights? Does the emphasis on collecting intelligence about radicalization alienate the very com-
munities whose help is so clearly needed in the fight against terrorism and perhaps even affect American Muslims’ 
generally positive view of their place in American society? In sum, given our understanding of radicalization, is 
our response rational—or, in any event, sufficiently tailored?
…
This report explores how the unsubstantiated “religious conveyor belt” theory has influenced our response to 
radicalization among American Muslims and the consequences that have ensued. Since much of the government’s 
response to radicalization is driven by perceptions of the risk of homegrown terrorist attacks, the report begins 
by demonstrating the differences of opinion between the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies 
regarding this threat. 
The next section reviews studies by psychologists, social scientists, the security services of the United Kingdom, 
and security experts, all of which point to a widespread consensus that radicalization is a multi-faceted and fluid 
process. It is simply not possible to identify “markers” of radicalization (as opposed to actual connections to 
terrorist networks or plots) that allow early identification of would-be terrorists. This section also observes that 
empirical studies largely debunk the claim that religiosity is linked to a propensity for terrorism.
  
The report’s third section turns to our own government’s efforts 
to understand radicalization. It shows that, despite the apparent 
understanding of the lead agencies on radicalization (i.e., DHS 
and NCTC) of the state of research on the subject, the “reli-
gious conveyor belt” model has never been repudiated. It further 
demonstrates that the FBI, along with many state and local law 
enforcement agencies, have followed the lead of the New York 
City Police Department (NYPD) in affirmatively embracing the 
“religious conveyer belt” model.
The fourth section of the report examines the interplay between the “religious conveyor belt” model and coun-
terterrorism policy. It argues that this model reinforces intelligence gathering that focuses on religious beliefs and 
behavior. American Muslims are understandably alienated by this approach (and reluctant to provide information 
about protected religious practices). This has led to a growing wariness in their relationships with law enforce-
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ment agencies and undermined outreach efforts that the government holds up as ways to curtail radicalization 
and fight terrorism. 
Finally, the report sets out recommendations for developing and strengthening institutional mechanisms to en-
sure that our response to radicalization takes account of the investigative needs of law enforcement agencies, as 
well as the ways in which the current approach to intelligence collection affects American Muslim communities. 
It also calls for an accounting of the First Amendment and ethnic/religious profiling implications of current anti-
radicalization tactics. 
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THe THReaT of HoMeGRown TeRRoRIsM:  
DIVeRGenT assessMenTs
Homegrown terrorists are “terrorist operatives who are U.S. persons … who were radicalized in the United States 
and learned terrorist tactics either here or in training camps [abroad].”17 Although the number of attacks allegedly 
attempted by these types of individuals remains very small, the past two years have seen a wave of high-profile 
incidents. The effect of these incidents is readily apparent in media coverage and public opinion. Headlines about 
“American Jihadis” have proliferated.18 According to an April 2010 poll conducted by CBS News, 38 percent of 
Americans believe that homegrown violence is the gravest terrorist threat.19 That number reflects an increase of 
eight points since CBS News’ last poll on the subject. Meanwhile, the percentage of Americans who believe that 
the greatest threat comes from international terrorism dropped ten points.
While fear of homegrown terrorism is on the rise, the Intelligence Community’s February 2010 analysis of the 
threats facing the United States reflects its assessment that the greatest risk continues to be an attack by Al Qaeda 
and affiliated groups abroad, acting directly or through American intermediaries. Local law enforcement agencies, 
however, emphasize the threat from radicalized American Muslims who are inspired by, but operate indepen-
dently from, foreign terrorist groups. The FBI, for its part, has trod carefully. Although it has not repudiated the 
assessment of the Intelligence Community, it has consistently placed strong emphasis on the risk of attacks by 
independent homegrown cells. Experts outside the government divide sharply on the issue.
The Intelligence Community’s 2010 Annual Threat Assessment 
focuses on whether terrorists have support structures and net-
works in the United States that would enable them to carry out at-
tacks without operational support from a foreign terrorist group. 
Given the scant evidence of these types of structures, the assess-
ment found only a limited likelihood of attacks by homegrown 
terrorists.20 “A handful of individuals and small, discrete cells will 
seek to mount attacks each year, with only a small portion of that 
activity materializing into violence against the Homeland.”21 
The terrorist plots in 2009 and 2010 have led some federal agencies to note the “diversification” of threats in terms 
of sources, tactics, and targets.22 The new sources include groups that have not previously attacked the United 
States, as well as a few U.S. persons with no known operational links to a foreign terrorist organization.23 In their 
February 2011 testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, both the head of the NCTC and the 
Secretary of DHS asserted that the homegrown threat had increased.24 
Several prominent security experts argue that the homegrown threat is of modest scope. For example, the Rand 
Corporation’s analysis of data on homegrown terrorism (“Rand Study”) concluded that the risk, as evidenced 
by the number of terrorism plots and data on attitudes among American Muslims, is limited. Prosecutions for 
I.
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homegrown terrorism have averaged approximately six per year since September 2001.25 In contrast, the 1970s 
saw an average of 60 to 70 terrorist incidents on U.S. soil each year, “a level of terrorist activity 15 to 20 times 
that seen in most of the years since 9/11.”26 The Rand Study noted the increase in activity in 2009, with 13 
cases reported;27 however, it concluded that even this number was very low and “hardly represents an explosion 
of radical fervor.”28 
This conclusion is entirely consistent with that of a detailed analysis by Duke University and the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill (“Duke/UNC Study”).29 An update to the Duke/UNC Study published in Febru-
ary 2011 found that even the reported increase in incidents in 2009 could well have been an aberration because, 
in 2010, the number of incidents dropped close to the levels seen prior to 2009.30 
The Rand Study found no evidence that American Muslims were 
becoming more radical. It pointed to the results of a 2007 Pew 
Research Center survey, “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and 
Mostly Mainstream,”31 which showed that an overwhelming ma-
jority of American Muslims express negative views of Al Qaeda. 
It also noted that, unlike in certain other Western countries, “ex-
pressions of Muslim militancy are muted and rare” in the United 
States.32 The Rand Study concluded that individuals turning toward violence would find little support in Ameri-
can Muslim communities; “They are not Mao’s guerrillas swimming in a friendly sea.”33 
On the other side of the debate, important voices claim that the threat posed by radicalization is greater than the 
empirical data on indictments and prosecutions suggest. Those who take this position argue that 1) the availability 
of information and support on the Internet obviates the need for a domestic operational support network; or 
2) American Muslims are radicalized and provide the necessary support base. They point to the availability of Al 
Qaeda-inspired ideology on the Internet as evidence of radicalization and assert that recent incidents of domestic 
terrorism are harbingers of a coming wave of attacks. 
The most prominent local law enforcement agency to argue that the radicalization of American Muslims poses a 
greater risk than suggested by the empirical data is the NYPD.34 Police chiefs from California, Kansas, and New 
Jersey,35 as well as Senator Joseph Lieberman, the Chairman of the Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, share this assessment.36 Senator Lieberman’s new counterpart in the House, Representative 
Peter King, has likewise expressed serious concern about the potential for attacks by American Muslims and has 
commenced a series of hearings to explore the threat.37
Although the FBI has not explicitly diverged from the assessment of the Intelligence Community, it too consis-
tently highlights how the domestic threat has evolved from one driven by Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations 
to one merely inspired by Al Qaeda ideology. For example, in September 2009, FBI Director Robert Mueller 
testified that the nature of the terrorist threat facing the United States had changed over the past eight years. In 
The Rand study found no  
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addition to the threat from Al Qaeda, “we also face a challenge in dealing with homegrown extremists in the 
United States who while not formally part of these terrorist organizations, believe in their ideologies and wish to 
harm the United States.”38 Testifying a year later, he echoed many of the same themes.39 
The view that the risk of homegrown terrorism is increasing in importance, relative to that of plots driven from 
abroad, also has its supporters among national security experts. These experts differ, however, on whether the 
danger comes from autonomous self-radicalized Americans,40 or whether Al Qaeda and similar organizations have 
managed to develop a U.S. support and recruitment structure.41 
Given the piecemeal and contradictory information that is publicly available, an outside observer can hardly eval-
uate who is right in this ongoing discourse. The debate nonetheless plays an important role in resource allocation 
and policy development. It influences which parts of the federal and state counterterrorism bureaucracies that 
have sprung up since 9/1142 get the largest share of resources.43 Equally important, police and intelligence agencies 
select investigative techniques depending on their understanding of the configuration of the risks they face.44 
The divergent threat assessments outlined above seep into the understandings of radicalization put forward by 
various U.S. government agencies. In particular, the NYPD and the FBI have put forward radicalization theories 
that are congruent with efforts to penetrate American Muslim communities. These theories, however, are unduly 
reductionist and are contrary to research conducted by governments, social scientists, and psychologists. 
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THe PaTH To TeRRoRIsM: neITHeR PReDICTable, noR RelIGIoUs
Since 9/11, research aimed at understanding radicalization among Muslim communities in Western countries 
has proliferated. Although our understanding is far from complete and continues to evolve as the phenomenon is 
studied from a variety of perspectives, there is overwhelming support for two propositions: 
1)  There is no profile of the type of person who becomes a terrorist; indeed, the process by which a per-
son embraces violence is fluid, making it nearly impossible to predict who will move from espousing 
“radical” views to committing violent acts; and 
2)  Although the view that Islam requires attacks on Western targets (frequently described as jihadism) 
may provide an organizing principle or worldview that supports terrorism, Islam itself does not drive 
terrorism. In fact, the most recent research suggests that a well-developed Muslim identity actually 
counteracts jihadism.
The first finding suggests that indiscriminately collecting intelligence on American Muslims where there is no 
indication of a link to terrorism or crime is unlikely to prove useful in identifying “would-be” terrorists. By ques-
tioning the view that Islam drives terrorism and that religiosity is an indicator of incipient violence, the second 
finding undercuts the justification for collecting intelligence about religious behavior and targeting venues where 
people might discuss or practice their religion.
a. no Identifiable Terrorist Profile or Hallmarks of Radicalization
Despite the impetus to find a terrorist profile or hallmarks of radicalization to hone in on incipient terrorists, 
empirical research has emphatically and repeatedly concluded that there is no such profile and no such easily 
identifiable hallmarks.
An in-depth empirical study by the United Kingdom’s security service MI5 (“British MI5 Study”)45 found 
there was no typical profile of the British terrorist,46 and that the process by which people came to embrace 
violence was complex. It emphasized that “there is no single pathway to extremism,” and that all those studied 
“had taken strikingly different journeys to violent extremist activity.”47 In 2010, another key U.K. government 
agency cautioned,
We do not believe that it is accurate to regard radicalization in this country as a linear “con-
veyor belt” moving from grievance, through radicalization, to violence … This thesis seems 
to both misread the radicalization process and to give undue weight to ideological factors.48
The conclusions of MI5 are largely consistent with the analysis in Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenti-
eth Century, in which former CIA case officer and psychologist Marc Sageman analyzed more than 500 cases to 
II.
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understand how people “evolve into terrorists.”49 While Sageman 
described the radicalization process as having several stages,50 
he emphasized that there was no linear progression from one 
stage to the next and that “[o]ne cannot simply draw a line, 
put markers on it and gauge where people are along this path 
to see whether they are close to committing atrocities.51 Simi-
larly, 14 years of “research conducted at [the Rand Corpora-
tion] and elsewhere suggests that no single pathway towards 
terrorism exists, making it somewhat difficult to identify overarching patterns in how and why individuals 
are susceptible to terrorist recruitment as well as intervention strategies.”52 Rand’s model was unable to pre-
dict who among similarly situated people would adopt radical views, or to identify the smaller sub-set of 
individuals who would commit violence.53 Indeed, the latter was the most difficult to isolate and was “often 
a matter of happenstance.”54 
These conclusions are fully supported by decades of research on the various waves of terrorism that have emerged 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.55 A DHS-supported academic study of pathways to terrorism and 
political violence identified 12 separate mechanisms of radicalization that operate at the individual, group, and 
mass levels and that can interact in a variety of ways.56 The study concluded
There is no one path, no “trajectory profile” to political radicalization. Rather there are many 
different paths… . Some of these paths do not include radical ideas or activism on the way 
to radical action, so the radicalization progression cannot be understood as an invariable set 
of steps or “stages” from sympathy to radicalism.57 
The complexity of the pathways to terrorism is aptly summarized in John Horgan’s classic text on the subject: 
“The reality is that there are many factors (often so complex in their combination that it can be difficult to delin-
eate them) that can come to bear on an individual’s intentional or unintentional socialization into involvement 
with terrorism.”58 Indeed, as a recent report by the U.S. Department of Defense emphasized, it is notoriously 
difficult to predict violent behavior of any sort. “Identifying potentially dangerous people before they act is dif-
ficult. Examinations after the fact show that people who commit violence usually have one or more risk factors for 
violence. Few people in the population who have risk factors, however, actually [commit violent acts].”59 
In short, government studies and scholars have repeatedly highlighted the difficulty of predicting which individuals 
are likely to commit violent acts. They have cautioned against viewing radicalization as a “conveyor belt” that starts 
with grievances and ends with violence, with easily discernible signposts along the way.
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b. Terrorism’s Connection to Islam is Generally overstated and Misunderstood
Given the rhetoric used by the 9/11 attackers and those who have come in their wake, it is no surprise that 
“religion is assumed to lie at the heart of Islamist terrorism.”60 This assumption has led some to suggest that we 
should look to Muslim communities to find incipient terrorists and that expressions of devout faith are signs that 
someone is likely to become a terrorist. The notion that the practice of Islam is, in and of itself, a precursor to 
terrorism appears to have gained a hold on the American psyche, as demonstrated by the recent furor over plans 
to build an Islamic cultural center in downtown Manhattan and protests against mosques around the country.61 
The view that Islam drives terrorism also seems to have found its way into some government understandings of 
the radicalization process. 
Even leaving aside the important First Amendment and profiling concerns raised by the embrace of such an 
assumption by government officials, the religiosity-terrorism connection is simply not borne out by empirical 
research. The British MI5 Study explicitly debunked this view. It found that “[f ]ar from being religious zealots, a 
large number of those involved in terrorism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and 
could actually be regarded as religious novices.”62 Sageman’s review of 500 cases, as well as multiple other empirical 
studies, have found that “a lack of religious literacy and education appears to be a common feature among those 
that are drawn to [terrorist] groups.”63 Indeed, there is evidence that “a well-established religious identity actually 
protects against violent radicalization.”64 
A recent study of 117 homegrown terrorists in the United States and United Kingdom (“FDD Study”) exam-
ined the linkage between terrorism and a conservative understanding of Islam.65 While there are questions as to 
whether the type of sampling technique used in the study is at all useful in predicting violence,66 even among 
the sample population examined, the FDD Study was unable to establish that a significant proportion of actual 
terrorists exhibited the “religious” behaviors identified as indicative of radicalization.67 For example, only 17.1 
percent of the sample exhibited low tolerance for perceived theological deviance and only 15.4 percent of the 
sample attempted to impose their religious beliefs on others.68 The relatively low correlation between religiosity 
and terrorism—in a study that seemed aimed at finding such a correlation—is a strong indication that conserva-
tive religious belief may play a lesser role in radicalization than one might assume.
Overall, the available research does not support the view that Islam drives terrorism or that observing the Muslim 
faith—even a particularly stringent or conservative variety of that faith—is a step on the path to violence.69 In 
fact, that research suggests the opposite: Instead of promoting radicalization, a strong religious identity could well 
serve to inoculate people against turning to violence in the name of Islam. 
C. Policy Implications of empirical Research
Empirical research on radicalization conclusively shows that the path to terrorism is far from linear. While studies 
have identified various factors that may influence the process, including personal circumstances, perceptions of 
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injustice (both local and international), exposure to ideology that promotes violence as “jihad,” and social bonds, 
it simply does not support the notion of a clear path from personal or political discontent to violence. The process 
is so complex that there are no easily identifiable markers, short of signs of participation in known terrorist net-
works or plots, that will alert law enforcement personnel when someone is becoming a terrorist. 
One aspect of the social science research that bears particular attention is the conclusion that contact with other 
violent extremists is generally necessary in order for people with radical beliefs to embrace violence. Sageman, 
for example, has argued that mobilization by existing networks is critical to becoming a terrorist. MI5 concluded 
that radicalization “is always driven by contact with others.”70 These findings suggest that targeted intelligence 
gathering and normal police work—exploring the connections of known terrorist networks and following up on 
tips of genuinely suspicious activity, for example—would allow law enforcement officers to identify individuals 
before they undertake violence.71 
A recent study by the Institute of Homeland Security Solutions (“HSS Study”) confirms this common sense 
conclusion. The HSS Study examined 86 terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine the 
types of information that led to their discovery. More than 80 percent of the foiled plots were discovered “via 
observations from law enforcement or the general public.”72 By contrast, intelligence reporting was the source 
of initial clues in just 19 percent of the cases that have been publicly reported.73 While the HSS Study did not 
discount the importance of intelligence gathering, it emphasized “the importance of more basic processes, such as 
ensuring that investigative leads are properly pursued, which unclassified reporting suggests have foiled an order 
of magnitude more cases.”74 
Of course, monitoring all potential venues where contact with violent extremists could potentially occur, which 
Sageman and others have identified as including Muslim religious spaces, student associations, and community 
centers,75 might also achieve the goal of prevention. However, such broad intelligence collection is likely to be 
incredibly resource-intensive and, given the complexity of the radicalization process, seems unlikely to yield 
commensurate dividends. Such a strategy also has significant costs in terms of undermining the legitimacy of 
our counterterrorism efforts among the very communities whose help is most needed in combating terrorism. 
The HSS Study underscored the importance of this type of help, 
noting that the communities from which terrorists came helped 
thwart 40 percent of terrorist plots by providing tips to the 
authorities. It specifically recommended that law enforcement 
agencies avoid tactics that might alienate these communities, 
such as “indiscriminately targeting individuals and groups due 
to their race, ethnicity, religion or ideology.”76 
Similarly—given the variety of personal, political, social, economic 
and ideological factors that play into the radicalization process—
targeting Islam as the engine driving radicalization is simply not 
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to be incredibly resource-intensive 
and, given the complexity of the 
radicalization process, seems unlikely 
to yield commensurate dividends.
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justified on the basis of current research. It is obvious that exposure to ideologies that portray violence as “jihad” 
can be part of the radicalization process. Given the small number of domestic attacks, it is equally obvious that not 
everybody who is exposed to this type of ideology becomes a terrorist, so allocating intelligence and law enforcement 
resources on this basis is irrational. More insidious is the idea that religiosity is somehow indicative of radicalization, 
which in turn will lead to violence. This discredited notion implicitly supports government monitoring of religious 
spaces even where there is no other indication of a link to terrorism, and it contravenes our long-standing abhorrence 
of government intrusion into people’s exercise of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, association, 
and religion.
These basic findings are well understood by key federal agencies. The FBI and some local law enforcement agencies, 
however, have adopted theories of radicalization that draw conclusions at odds with the social science research.
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U.s. GoVeRnMenT UnDeRsTanDInGs of RaDICalIzaTIon
An analysis of official statements from federal and state agencies reveals important differences between the lead 
agencies on radicalization (DHS and the NCTC) on the one hand, and the FBI and local law enforcement agen-
cies on the other.77 First, DHS and the NCTC acknowledge that radicalization is a fluid process in which a variety 
of factors can play a role.These agencies have shied away from suggesting they can identify “markers” of radicaliza-
tion. The analysis of domestic law enforcement agencies (e.g., the NYPD and the FBI), however, posits a model 
in which radicalization is a defined process with identifiable markers (primarily religious behavior) along the way. 
Second, although DHS and the NCTC acknowledge the use of Islam as a justification for terrorism, they have 
carefully emphasized that radicalization is not caused by a particular religion or ideology. In contrast, the FBI, the 
NYPD, and other local law enforcement agencies have put Islam front and center in their analyses. 
a. DHs and nCTC: Recognition of the Complexity of Radicalization Process 
Senior officials at DHS, the primary federal agency charged with studying and countering radicalization, have consis-
tently emphasized that the process of radicalization is not linear: that there “are diverse ‘pathways’ to radicalization,”78 
rather than a “one-way-street.”79 They have identified “a variety of human and institutional catalysts, such as formal 
and informal religious institutions” and “[c]harismatic leaders,” and risk factors, such as “[i]nsular communities with 
little exposure to moderating influences” and a “deterioration of familial, social and societal ties.”80 DHS Secretary 
Napolitano recently acknowledged that “there is much we do not know about how individuals come to adopt violent 
extremist beliefs.”81 In May 2010, a group of law enforcement and community leaders advising Secretary Napolitano 
similarly noted that the “current level of understanding regarding the sociology of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’ is 
still immature,” and rejected the notion that there are overt signs of radicalization.82 
DHS officials have repeatedly cautioned that increasing religiosity does not in itself signal a turn to violence. For 
example, the head of Intelligence at DHS differentiated belief systems from criminal acts “by emphasizing the dif-
ference between related social patterns, some of which may eventually lead to terrorism.”83 In other words, he recog-
nized that an obvious turn toward religion did not necessarily signify a propensity for terrorism. Recent statements 
by DHS leadership that the department is concerned with “violent extremism,” rather than with the belief system 
itself,84 underscore the agency’s recognition that particular religious beliefs are not, in and of themselves, signs of 
incipient terrorism.85
Like DHS, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which includes the NCTC, has also re-
jected the idea of a fixed trajectory of radicalization. The NCTC website asserts that “[r]adicalization is a dynamic 
and multi-layered process involving several factors that interact with one another to influence an individual. 
There is no single factor that explains radicalization and mobilization.”86 The NCTC specifically repudiates the 
idea that there are “visible signs of radicalization,” noting that “[c]hanges in appearance during different stages of 
radicalization often are the same changes seen in individuals who are not being radicalized, making it difficult to 
identify visible markers.”87 
III.
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High-level NCTC officials have put forward this view in con-
gressional testimony. In 2008, its director testified that there is 
“no single underlying catalyst for the initial stages of radicaliza-
tion … [P]ersonal frustration at perceived social injustice and 
other grievances can prompt individuals to reassess their accepted 
worldview and be more open to alternative perspectives—some 
of which espouse violence.”88 Even being brought into a radical 
group “does not mean that an individual will be drawn fully into 
violent extremist activity,” and acceptance of “the sacred authority of the violent extremist” did not explain why 
some individuals turned to violence.89 Rather, a number of factors “may play a role in determining the final stage 
where an individual accepts the extremist worldview and ultimately engages in violent, high-risk behavior.” 90 
These include factors that may encourage or discourage violence, such as previous knowledge of Islam, learning 
or authority attributes, technical education, countervailing influences, peer pressure, and lack of exposure to 
extremist atrocities.91 
b. law enforcement agencies’ Reductionist Theories of Radicalization 
Contrary to government and social science research and the views put forward by DHS and the NCTC, the 
NYPD and the FBI have suggested that radicalization can be disrupted in its early stages by law enforcement 
agents trained to look for the right signs. Their contention that “radical Islamic views” drive violence supports this 
framework and implicitly justifies targeting of American Muslim religious behavior. The influence of this theory 
is evident in its adoption by a number of local law enforcement agencies92 and in law enforcement agencies’ op-
erational approaches, which rely heavily on monitoring American Muslim communities. The Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has also explicitly embraced this model, most recently in the 
report on the Fort Hood attack issued by the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee.93 
Much of the law enforcement modeling of radicalization—even within the FBI, the primary federal law enforce-
ment agency with jurisdiction over domestic terrorism—is based on the NYPD’s report on Radicalization in the 
West: The Homegrown Threat (“NYPD Report”).94 This report has been roundly criticized by Muslim, Arab, and 
South Asian community groups and by civil liberties advocates, both for its methodology and for its conclu-
sions.95 In 2009, the NYPD quietly issued a revised version of the report, adding a “Statement of Clarification.”96 
While this statement disavows some of the most troubling implications of the first report, the substance of the 
original report (which contains significant content entirely contradictory to the clarifications) remains in place, 
suggesting that the NYPD has not, in fact, moved away from its initial views about radicalization.
The NYPD Report uses limited data and employs faulty methodology. Not only does the report rely upon a 
handpicked sample to draw conclusions about a broader population, it does so based on just 10 case studies.97 The 
NYPD relies on this inadequate sample set to conclude that there is a consistent, predictable pattern of four stages 
of radicalization, with each stage being “unique” and having “specific signatures.”98 The stages are 1) “pre-radical-
DHs officials have repeatedly 
cautioned that increasing religiosity 
does not in itself signal a turn to 
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ization,” the signatures of which are being young, Muslim, middle-class, male, and from an immigrant family;99 
2) “self-identification,” when an individual “begins to explore Salafi Islam,” a step that is reflected in alienation, 
giving up specified behaviors (smoking cigarettes, drinking, gambling, and wearing urban street-wear), wearing 
traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard, and becoming involved in social activism and community issues; 
3) “indoctrination,” which is signaled by withdrawal from a mosque and the politicization of new beliefs;100 and 
4) “jihadization,” or operational planning for a terrorist attack, the signs of which include “Outward Bound-like 
activities,” research on the Internet, conducting reconnaissance, and acquiring material.101 
Unlike social science and government research, which posits tentative and fluid “stages” of radicalization, the 
NYPD Report presents its thinly supported findings as conclusive evidence that radicalization runs a predictable 
course. Even though the report concedes that not all those who begin the process of radicalization carry out ter-
rorist acts,102 its overall message is one of certainty about the path to violence. For example, the NYPD Report 
contends that “there is a remarkable consistency in the behaviors and trajectory of each of the plots [examined] 
across the stages” and that “this consistency provides a tool for predictability.”103 The report seeks to buttress this 
unjustified assertion of certainty with a variety of charts and graphs that imply scientific research and definitive 
conclusions.104 For example, the chart reproduced below shows “jihadi-Salafi Ideology” leading to “Attack.”105 It 
suggests an inevitable progression from “pre-radicalization” (i.e., being a young, second or third-generation male 
Muslim) to a terrorist attack.
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Although the NYPD Report concedes there is no profile for a potential terrorist,106 it effectively develops such 
a profile by identifying “signatures” for each stage of radicalization. In addition to the dubious validity of de-
veloping signatures based on a handful of cases, the hallmarks of radicalization identified by the NYPD are of 
limited, if any, utility. Contrary to social science norms, the NYPD Report fails to consider whether the reli-
gious conduct and expressive activity that it characterizes as early signatures of radicalization occur with any 
more frequency among terrorists than among all American Muslims.107 Compounding this flaw, the innocuous 
nature of many of the signatures identified by the NYPD—such as growing a beard or becoming involved in 
community activities—means that they are likely to be found in a large segment of the American Muslim 
population. If the NYPD (or other agencies that rely on the report) were to attach significance to these types 
of markers, they would be monitoring a very large set of people without much likelihood of finding terrorists. 
This, as the NYPD itself acknowledged in the 2009 clarification to its report,108 would constitute an enormous 
waste of law enforcement resources.
Nonetheless, increased surveillance and monitoring of American Muslim communities is the NYPD report’s pre-
scription. The NYPD emphasizes the need for early intervention, noting that it had shifted its focus to the “point 
where we believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicaliza-
tion.”109 This suggests that the NYPD believes that the appropriate time for law enforcement officers to intervene 
is at the beginning of the process—i.e., in the “pre-radicalization” phase—where the radicalization “signature” is 
essentially being a young Muslim man.
The NYPD Report emphatically asserts—contrary to the weight of government and academic research and the 
statements of DHS and the NCTC—that religious belief is the most important indicator of radicalization:
Jihadist or jihadi-Salafi ideology is the driver that motivates young men and women, born 
or living in the West, to carry out “autonomous jihad” via acts of terrorism against their 
host countries. It guides movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment and is the 
basis for action.110 
This assertion pre-empts objections based on First Amendment concerns and suggests that monitoring individu-
als’ ideology would allow law enforcement officers to prevent terrorism.
 
Not only has the NYPD Report been adopted by several of the state and local law enforcement agencies that are 
touted as the front lines in our defense against homegrown terrorism,111 it also appears to have greatly influenced 
the FBI’s thinking on radicalization.112 The FBI’s model, while less detailed than that of the NYPD, also paints the 
radicalization process as one in which law enforcement officers can pinpoint religious and associational behavior 
that is indicative of a future propensity to engage in violence.
The FBI asserts that, “consistent with the First Amendment,” it “defines radical individuals as persons who en-
courage, condone, justify, or support the commission of a violent act or other crimes against the U.S. govern-
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ment, its citizens, or its allies for political, social, or economic ends.”113 Although the FBI concedes that not every 
individual will go through each step of the radicalization process,114 it tries, like the NYPD, to identify early 
indicators for those who demonstrate a potential for violence.115 
Similarly to the NYPD, the Bureau delineates four stages in the radicalization process, which are reflected in the 
chart reproduced below:116
The Radicalization Process
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The bulk of the FBI’s explanation of this chart is concerned with the first pre-radicalization stage, which is marked 
by an individual’s conversion either to Islam or to a more conservative version of Islam.117 Instead of explicitly 
identifying signatures of this stage, the FBI focuses on venues where a person might have an opportunity to 
undertake such a conversion. In addition to mosques, the FBI lists a variety of locations where Muslims interact 
(e.g., conferences and places of employment) as potential gateways to radicalization. While the Bureau does not 
specify what it might look for in these interactions, its concern with “conversion” to particular versions of Islam 
18 | Brennan center For JUStice
suggests that it would focus its attention on religiosity. This is made even clearer when one looks at the second 
phase, “identification,” which is described as being marked by increasing commitment to religion as demonstrat-
ed by “liv[ing] every detail of the religion.”118 The other marker of the second phase is making connections with 
like-minded individuals—i.e., those who hold “extremist” views, and not (as one might expect) people who have 
terrorist or criminal connections.119 In sum, the FBI’s radicalization theory suggests that the Bureau is concerned 
about Muslims who become more conservative in their religious practice well before they take any steps towards 
violence and is focusing its attention on the places where such religious behavior may occur.120
A 2010 presentation by the FBI’s Houston Office to Muslim community leaders illustrates how FBI agents make 
use of this model. The presentation was based almost entirely on the NYPD Report and included slides showing 
the radicalization trajectory conceived by the NYPD, as well as the NYPD’s demographic, religious, and ethnic 
radicalization signatures.121 In addition, it was reported that the FBI agents making the presentation asked the 
community to report on people who were “taking extreme positions” and “trying to enforce a limited understand-
ing of religion.”122 An example of such behavior, according to the agents, was if someone asked women in the 
congregation to wear a hijab (head scarf ) or veil.123 
Late last year, faced with plots that did not fit into this radicalization model, FBI Director Mueller acknowledged 
that the threat from homegrown terrorism may have evolved to include “extremists from a diverse set of back-
grounds, geographic locations, life experiences, and motivating factors.”124 While this may suggest that the FBI is 
retreating from some of its earlier conclusions about radicalization, there are no signs that the Bureau is pulling 
back from monitoring American Muslim communities and surveillance and infiltration of mosques, as discussed 
in the next section of this report.
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ResPonse To RaDICalIzaTIon: IMPaCT of “RelIGIoUs ConVeYoR belT” 
THeoRY
Obviously, some terrorists are Muslims, but only a tiny sliver of a fraction of American Muslims engage in 
terrorism. How can law enforcement and intelligence agencies combat terrorism without tarring an entire 
community? We have faced such complex public safety challenges before in our history. Organized crime, for 
example, has often been rooted in specific ethnic or religious communities. Using the Racketeer Influenced 
Corrupt Organizations Act and other tools, law enforcement broke the back of crime families. But it did so 
without randomly probing and stigmatizing entire ethnic communities. In contrast, law enforcement agen-
cies’ current response to the complex question of radicalization among American Muslims is heavily reliant on 
scattershot intelligence gathering, even when this risks good relations with the very communities with which 
it seeks to partner in fighting terrorism.
When asked what it is doing to combat the threat of radicalization among American Muslims, the FBI gener-
ally has two responses: 1) it cites its own intelligence-gathering capabilities and its leveraging of the intelli-
gence-gathering capabilities of its federal, state, and local law enforcement partners; and 2) it notes its efforts 
to foster good relations with Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities and to encourage them to report on 
the “radicalization of individuals toward violent Islamic extremism.”125 Occasionally, the Bureau casts the latter 
set of activities as attempts to “dispel misconceptions” that may foster radicalization.126 
Although the FBI does not explain how it deploys its intelligence-gathering capabilities, there is accumulating 
evidence that its monitoring and surveillance efforts target American Muslim communities and religious insti-
tutions. This response is congruent with the “religious conveyor belt” theory of radicalization. Less is known 
about local law enforcement agencies’ intelligence activities, but there are indications that they follow a similar 
pattern.  Often the information collected—e.g., about communities considered susceptible to radicalization 
and about the tenor and content of sermons and people’s views about religion and politics—is relevant only to 
the early stages of radicalization as envisioned by law enforcement agencies rather than to operational planning 
for an attack. 
a. Monitoring and surveillance of american Muslim Communities by the fbI 
1. Domain Information Collection
Since 9/11, the FBI has transformed itself into a domestic intelligence agency with broad new powers to gather 
information about people, communities, and institutions, even where there is absolutely no indication that they 
are linked to criminal activity or threats to national security. The Bureau’s new powers are embodied in changes 
to the Attorney General Guidelines for the Conduct of Domestic FBI Operations (“AG Guidelines”), which 
have regulated the Bureau’s conduct of investigations since the 1970s, when evidence of decades-long abuse 
of its authorities came to light.127 Under the new guidelines, the FBI is no longer limited to investigating 
IV.
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suspicions of criminal or terrorist activity. It can now go out 
and gather “information needed for broader analytic and intel-
ligence purposes.”128 FBI Director Mueller has described the ac-
tivities under this rubric as the Bureau’s attempt to learn about 
its domain, which means “understanding every inch of a given 
community—its geography, its populations, its economy and 
its vulnerabilities.”129
While this sounds innocuous enough, the rubric of domain in-
formation collection may be used to target ethnic and religious 
communities—in particular, American Muslims. Indeed, the 
Domestic Intelligence and Operations Guide (“DIOG”), 
which implements the AG Guidelines and was publicly re-
leased in part in 2010, explicitly states that this authority can and should be used to collect information about 
“concentrated ethnic communities.”130 FBI Field Offices are authorized to “identify locations of concentrated 
ethnic communities in the Field Office’s domain … [and] the locations of ethnic-oriented businesses.”131 To 
initiate data collection, the Field Office needs only to believe that the information would aid in the analysis 
of “potential threats and vulnerabilities” and assist in “domain awareness.”132 Although the DIOG prohibits 
“the collection of cultural and behavioral information about an ethnic community that bears no relationship 
to a valid investigative or analytical need,” it allows FBI agents to consider “focused behavioral characteristics 
reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community,” 
as well as “behavioral and cultural information about ethnic or racial communities” that may be exploited by 
criminals or terrorists “who hide within those communities.”133 
The domain information collection authority interacts with the FBI’s theory that one sign of radicaliza-
tion is “becoming more committed to the newfound faith … demonstrated by living ‘every detail of the 
religion’”134 to support collecting cultural and behavioral information about American Muslims. Similarly, 
the FBI’s conclusion that potential terrorists could make contact in “mosques,” “prisons,” places of “employ-
ment,” “Internet chat rooms,” and “conferences” is available as a justification for monitoring these venues 
in ethnic enclaves.135
Available information suggests that the Bureau has made use of its new and expanded powers to undertake 
non-threat-based intelligence collection efforts in American Muslim communities. The FBI itself has indicated 
that such information gathering was taking place in Dearborn, Michigan, an area known for its large Arab-
American population.136 Some years earlier, the New York Times reported that the FBI had shown its agents a 
map of the San Francisco area “pocked with data showing where Iranian immigrants were clustered” in order 
to allow agents to develop an assessment of the threat emanating from that community.137 Most recently, when 
a Somali-American teenager from Minneapolis carried out a suicide mission for a terrorist group in Somalia, 
the FBI began monitoring Somali-American communities across the country.138 As a former high-level NYPD 
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rethinking radicalization | 21
official has noted, this intelligence gathering was not confined to people “about whom they had a tip or links 
to the teenager.”139 Rather, the Bureau’s
 
newfound focus on identifying social patterns (for example, concerning the “radicalization” 
of young Muslims) has led officials to collect and analyze intelligence relative to whole com-
munities or neighborhoods in search of meaningful trends (as opposed to intelligence re-
garding specific individuals about whom officials had already nurtured suspicions).140 
2.	 Infiltration	of	Mosques	
The FBI’s emphasis on religious behavior as a hallmark of radicalization also supports a second key change to 
the AG Guidelines: the elimination of the restriction that the Bureau may collect information on the political 
or religious activities of Americans only when investigating a specific crime.141 
Because the FBI has refused to release the portion of the DIOG that governs the infiltration of religious and 
political spaces, the criteria used by the agency to initiate such surveillance are unknown. FBI Director Muel-
ler has defended the agency’s use of informants within U.S. mosques, claiming that “generally,” the Bureau 
investigates “if there is evidence or information as to individual or individuals undertaking illegal activities 
in religious institutions.”142 But Director Mueller’s claim is inconsistent with mounting evidence that the FBI 
has recruited paid informants and community members to monitor speech and activity in mosques generally, 
rather than to follow up on specific concerns or individuals.
Perhaps the most compelling rebuttal of Director Mueller’s claim comes from FBI informants themselves. The 
recent case of the Newburgh Four—African-American Muslim converts who were convicted of plotting to 
blow up synagogues in the Bronx and using surface-to-air missiles to shoot down military planes—is instruc-
tive.143 Since much of the controversy surrounding the case related to entrapment,144 the informant testified 
at length about his assignment from the FBI. He explained that he was sent to mosques to find out what the 
Muslim community was saying and doing rather than to uncover particular criminal or terrorist activity.145 
The informant was not sent to just one mosque, but rather covered three separate institutions in upstate New 
York. His assignment was to “listen [and] talk to … the attendees of the mosque” and report back to his FBI 
handler.146 What types of information was he required to report? “If somebody was expressing radical views 
or extreme views.”147 The import of the informant’s instructions was not lost on the American Muslim com-
munity.  The largest American Muslim civil rights organization, the Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR), condemned the Bureau’s use of “surveillance measures, particularly of mosques, predicated on the 
idea that Muslims present security concerns minus any suspicion of criminal activity.”148  
Another FBI informant, Craig Monteilh, has claimed in a civil case against the Bureau that he was sent to infiltrate 
several mosques and Islamic centers in Orange, Los Angeles, and San Bernardino counties.149 While these claims have 
not been verified, his assertions regarding his tasking by the FBI are consistent with the testimony of the Newburgh 
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Four informant. At the very least, the local Orange County community believed that the FBI had sent Monteilh on 
a fishing expedition and its actions had made “Muslims … afraid to talk about politics or civil liberties issues within 
their mosques or even among their friends because of fear that it will draw attention from undercover agents.”150 
In addition to using paid informants to monitor mosques, the FBI has also asked—and sometimes pressured—
American Muslim community members to report on the views and activities of their fellow worshippers.  Docu-
ments obtained through Freedom of Information Act litigation in 2009 show that the FBI’s Southern California 
office kept tabs on a variety of lawful First Amendment activities of American Muslims.151 These included the subject 
and tenor of sermons given at mosques in Southern California,152 the Muslim groups involved in the immigration 
reform movement,153 and community events on family development.154 Also in 2009, the Council of Islamic Orga-
nizations of Michigan, an umbrella group of 19 mosques and community groups, filed an official complaint with 
Attorney General Holder because American Muslims had reported being asked to monitor people at mosques and 
to report on their charitable donations.155 
  
Why is the Bureau using these tactics? Its resources are limited and it undoubtedly does not wish to waste them on 
approaches that are unlikely to uncover terrorist plots. The answer may lie, in part, in the influence of the radicaliza-
tion model that has gained currency among law enforcement agencies. This model’s suggestion that radicalization is 
an inevitable process requiring early law enforcement action (i.e., before any commitment to violence takes place) 
and its identification of particular interpretations of Islam as the root cause of terrorism would support precisely the 
type of scattershot intelligence collection that is reportedly occurring. 
b.  Monitoring and surveillance of american Muslim Communities by state  
and local law enforcement agencies
In addition to collecting information as part of Joint Terrorism Task Forces,156 many state and local police forces have 
reconstituted intelligence-gathering units that had been dismantled in the 1970s following revelations of abusive 
surveillance tactics.157 It appears that this capability is being deployed in attempts to find “homegrown terrorists” in 
American Muslim communities. 
Examples abound. A particularly noteworthy one involves the head of Homeland Security in Kansas City, who, 
claiming that the city was vulnerable because it had significant pockets of Muslim refugees from East Africa and 
a concentration of Middle Eastern immigrants,158 developed a Patrol Guide, which included a section on the Rec-
ognition of Indicators/Interdiction of Potential Terrorist Threats.159 Upon completion of this training, a patrol officer 
purportedly would be able to identify a Muslim “extremist” during a car check, a pedestrian check, or a business or 
residence check. Despite near-unanimity about the difficulty of identifying signs of radicalization, it seems a Kansas 
City cop would be able to do so in the course of a writing a ticket.160
Information collected by state and local police is often fed into databases shared with federal law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies, such as those at fusion centers. These centers, 72 of which have been set up across the 
rethinking radicalization | 23
country with $426 million in funding from DHS,161 are state- 
and locally-created agencies that collect and analyze information 
about perceived threats to security and public order.162 As intel-
ligence gathering operations, the activities of these centers are 
generally shielded from public scrutiny.163 However, the reports 
that have emerged from fusion centers demonstrate that at least 
some local law enforcement agencies are monitoring American 
Muslim communities within their jurisdictions based on politi-
cal and religious activity, rather than on any indication of links 
to terrorism. The 2007 report of the Virginia Fusion Center, for 
example, described the Muslim American Society, a mainstream 
Muslim organization, as conducting subversive activities because 
it used “Boy and Girl Scout troops in 2006 as part of a massive get-out-the-vote campaign targeting Muslim vot-
ers in Virginia and elsewhere.”164 The North Central Texas Fusion Center’s 2009 “Prevention Awareness Bulletin” 
asserted that lobbying on “Islamic-based issues” by Muslim groups made it “imperative” for “law enforcement 
officers to report” on these groups and other Islamic organizations.165  
 
Local law enforcement agencies have devised techniques nearly identical to those of their federal counterparts. 
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) launched an unsuccessful drive to map ethnic communities similar 
to the domain information collection conducted by the FBI.”166 Courtroom testimony shows that the NYPD, like 
the FBI, has placed informants in mosques to gather general intelligence. Evidence introduced in the 2006 trial of 
Shahawar Matin Siraj, who was convicted of planning to bomb the Herald Square subway station, revealed that 
the paid police informant was sent to the Bay Ridge Mosque in Brooklyn to collect information with no specific 
target. The informant repeatedly testified that he went to the mosque “to pray and report what’s good and what’s 
strange.”167 He passed along to the NYPD “conversations … about lots of people … I was not there to report 
conversations for [sic] a certain person.”168 
In sum, while information on the use of such tactics is necessarily incomplete, there is considerable evidence that 
state and local law enforcement agencies, like the FBI, are collecting non-threat-based information about Ameri-
can Muslim communities, including on their religious behavior and practices. 
C.  american Muslims’ Perception of being a “suspect Group” and its Potential  
Impact on Cooperation with law enforcement efforts
The net effect of the monitoring and surveillance that has come to light, as well as other government pro-
grams that are explicitly aimed at Muslims, is that American Muslims often believe they are treated as a suspect 
class.169 Decades of research demonstrate that a community’s perception of the legitimacy of police tactics greatly 
influences its willingness to partner with law enforcement agencies. Unsurprisingly, American Muslims’ view of 
their treatment has led to a growing guardedness in their relationships with law enforcement agencies. Although 
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American Muslims have thus far been instrumental in assisting law enforcement agencies in thwarting terrorist 
plots, there is a risk that the tactics spawned by the “religious conveyor belt” theory of radicalization, such as 
broad surveillance and intrusion into religious spaces, could create barriers to this cooperation. 
American Muslims’ view that law enforcement agencies regard them as a suspect community has been widely noted 
by community leaders. At a hearing on racial profiling, the head of a national Muslim civil rights organization 
explained that monitoring had led American Muslims to perceive themselves as unjustly targeted by law enforce-
ment agencies.170 She emphasized that this type of attention was counter-productive because it increased “fear and 
suspicion within the Muslim community toward law enforcement” and made individuals “more reluctant to call 
the authorities when needed.”171 Similarly, a representative of another major American Muslim group testified that 
“[t]he perception of the community has become one where they believe they are viewed as suspect rather than part-
ner in the War on Terror, and that their civil liberties are ‘justifiably’ sacrificed upon the decisions of federal agents.”172 
Ingrid Mattson, the president of the Islamic Society of North America, and an influential American Muslim voice, 
has also noted the deterioration of relations between Arab American groups and law enforcement agencies.173 High-
profile cases of the type discussed above “have sown a corrosive fear among their people that F.B.I. informers are 
everywhere, listening.”174 In general, Mattson stated, “There is a sense that law enforcement is viewing our communi-
ties not as partners but as objects of suspicion.”175
Independent studies have confirmed the existence of this perception among American Muslim communities. For 
example, a 2008 Vera Institute report on the effect of post-9/11 policing on 16 Arab American communities across 
the United States found that Arab Americans were troubled by increased government scrutiny.176 Indeed, some 
Arab-American communities “were more afraid of law enforcement agencies—especially federal law enforcement 
agencies—than they were of acts of hate or violence, despite an increase in hate crimes.”177 Law enforcement officials 
have openly acknowledged this difficult dynamic,178 with the FBI noting that American Muslim communities “al-
most unanimously feel that government agents treat them as suspects and view all Muslims as extremists.”179 
The dynamic identified by community leaders, the Vera Institute, and law enforcement officials raises an important 
concern. Decades of research on policing show that perceptions of legitimacy correlate with the willingness of commu-
nities to cooperate with law enforcement agencies.180 A recent empirical study of American Muslims in the New York 
area (“New York Study”) concludes that this phenomenon is also applicable in the context of anti-terrorism policing.181 
Using models from studies of ordinary crime, the New York Study tested whether American Muslims were more likely 
to cooperate with anti-terrorism efforts for instrumental reasons (i.e., because they feared punishment or expected indi-
vidual and communal benefits from police efforts to control crime) or from normative motivations (i.e., because they 
believe authorities are legitimate and entitled to be obeyed).182 The New York Study found “a robust correlation between 
perceptions of procedural justice and both perceived legitimacy and willingness to cooperate among Muslim American 
communities in the context of antiterrorism policing.”183 In other words, American Muslim communities were more 
likely to cooperate with anti-terror efforts if they perceived these efforts to be carried out in a legitimate manner.184
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To date, despite concerns about the legitimacy of the government’s counterterrorism efforts (and contrary to the 
unsubstantiated claims made by Rep. Peter King in justifying his controversial radicalization hearings),185 American 
Muslims have an exemplary record of cooperating with law enforcement agencies on counterterrorism efforts. In-
deed, according to multiple studies, they have provided information on about 40 percent of the terrorist plots that 
have been foiled.186 Nonetheless, there is a serious risk that the perception that law enforcement’s tactics unfairly 
target American Muslims could have an impact on the willingness of at least some members of these communities to 
proactively cooperate with law enforcement agencies—particularly the FBI—and to come forward with suspicions 
or concerns.
Already there are indications that American Muslims are becoming more guarded in their interactions with law en-
forcement officials. Prominent Muslim organizations are now warning their communities not to speak to the Bureau 
without an attorney present. Muslim Advocates has put out an “Urgent Community Alert,” which notes that “the 
FBI is contacting Pakistani, South-Asian and other Muslim Americans to solicit information and advice about ad-
dressing violent extremism” and “strongly urges individuals not to speak with law enforcement officials without the 
presence or advice of an attorney.”187 Similarly, in May 2010, in response to “an increasing number of reports of FBI 
agents, along with other law enforcement officers, visiting and interviewing American Muslims,” CAIR embarked 
on a campaign to remind its constituents of their rights in interactions with law enforcement officials.188 Perhaps the 
starkest example is the warning issued by the American Muslim task force on Civil Rights and Elections, a national 
coalition of American Muslim organizations, that it would cease cooperating with the FBI unless the agency stopped 
infiltrating mosques and using “agents provocateurs to trap unsuspecting Muslim youth.”189 
  
If even a small proportion of American Muslims become wary of law enforcement officials because of intelligence 
collection practices that focus on religious beliefs and behavior, there could be negative consequences for the broad 
and unfettered cooperation on counterterrorism efforts that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies seek. Given 
that risk, the government should exercise care to avoid policies that undercut its broader counterterrorism goals.190
D.  Perception that american Muslims are Treated as suspect Class  
Could fuel Radicalization
American Muslims’ sensitivity to being treated as a suspect class may also have the unintended consequence, over 
the long term, of stimulating radicalization. Those charged with enforcing anti-terrorism laws have recognized 
this risk. One high-ranking LAPD officer told the Senate that the department’s “ultimate goal is to engender the 
continued loyalty and good citizenship of American-Muslims—not merely to disrupt terrorist activities.”191 Thus, 
while law enforcement agents must “hunt down and neutralize small numbers of ‘clusters’ on the criminal side of 
the radicalization trajectory,” they should do so with precision and care.192 As the officer put it, “What good is it to 
disrupt a group planning a mall bombing if the enforcement method is so unreasonable that it is widely criticized 
and encourages many more to enter the radicalization process?”193
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Scholars who study radicalization and terrorism have expressed similar concerns. Sageman, for example, has testi-
fied that the American Muslim community is “very sensitive to the action of local law enforcement agencies,” and 
if it perceives them “to act against its members, it will assume that the state is also against it.”194 At the same hear-
ing, another expert warned against creating a “grievance base” in the United States. In the United Kingdom, the 
experience of Muslims as a community historically subject to discrimination and then “singled out and defined in 
terms of the threat it potentially poses to security” has provided a “tangible basis on which to graft violent Islamist 
ideology.”195 Although such a grievance base has not traditionally been present among American Muslims, the 
expert warned,
Should Muslims in this country begin to feel more markedly singled out and/or defined in 
terms of terrorism and threats to national security, the easier it may be for some among them 
to understand the worldview and vision of Islamic extremism as something that addresses 
their life circumstances.196  
Those charged with designing our domestic counterterrorism policies should carefully evaluate whether current 
tactics could create such a “grievance base” in the United States.
e. failure of Government outreach to american Muslim Communities
At the same time as federal and local law enforcement agencies have expanded their monitoring of American 
Muslim communities, they have emphasized the need to build relationships with these communities.197 Such 
efforts have been criticized as uncoordinated and ineffective.198  It is rarely recognized, however, that even the 
best-coordinated outreach efforts are unlikely to succeed when paired with an approach to radicalization that 
emphasizes intelligence-gathering about religious behaviors and practices.
The FBI asserts that its outreach programs counter radicalization in two ways: 1) by allowing community con-
cerns to be aired and brought to the attention of policy-makers; and 2) by building trust between the FBI and the 
communities so they will assist in identifying violent extremists.199  However, the generally mistrustful relationship 
that seems to have developed between the FBI and American Muslim communities in recent years suggests that 
these programs have not been entirely successful.200   
A significant obstacle to the success of the FBI’s outreach programs is that they are not seen as influencing the 
national-level surveillance policies that are a principal concern for American Muslim communities.201 Although 
there are some national-level meetings, the vast bulk of outreach efforts are made at the field office level. FBI field 
representatives can take national policy concerns back to headquarters, but the prospects of such input leading 
to reform are remote.202  Indeed, rather than give serious attention to the grievances of American Muslim com-
munities, the FBI leadership has staunchly defended its powers and practices, giving rise to the perception that 
its outreach efforts are purely cosmetic—i.e., they provide an opportunity for the FBI to say that it has consulted 
with affected communities, but they do not result in serious engagement at the policy level.  
rethinking radicalization | 27
When the FBI attempts to use its outreach activities to obtain information about incipient radicalization, it 
exacerbates this dynamic. The putative markers of radicalization about which law enforcement agencies seek 
information are frequently tied to religious beliefs and behavior.  Asking American Muslims to report on these 
beliefs and behavior as signs of potential terrorism not only places them in an awkward position vis-à-vis their 
fellow believers, but it also reinforces the view that their faith and their communities are under siege.203  Some 
American Muslim organizations have specifically rejected engagement with law enforcement representatives on 
precisely these grounds, contending that as long as American Muslim communities “are indiscriminately targeted 
in counterterrorism investigations and considered to be suspicious, they cannot legitimately partner with law 
enforcement.”204 
Thus, rather than a two-way dialogue in which American Muslims are able to present their concerns about gov-
ernment policies to a receptive audience while FBI agents have the opportunity to learn about persons whose 
behaviors are genuinely suspicious, the FBI’s efforts at community outreach risk being perceived as insincere or as 
a one-way means for the government to gather information about community members’ religious practices.  Such 
a state of affairs holds little promise for combating radicalization. Indeed, one expert has suggested that the FBI 
in particular should get out of the outreach business, leaving that undertaking to local authorities, such as mayors’ 
offices.205  To the extent that such outreach is in fact a fundamental part of the government’s counter-radicalization 
and counterterrorism strategy, it clearly requires further thought.
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ConClUsIon anD ReCoMMenDaTIons 
Radicalization is a complex phenomenon, both to understand and to address.  As an initial matter, it is nearly 
impossible to pinpoint signs of radicalization in progress.  Despite a wealth of research documenting this fact, the 
government’s strategy, with its heavy emphasis on monitoring American Muslim communities, is being formed 
against the backdrop of a troublingly simplistic model of radicalization.  These tactics have undermined ef-
forts to build relationships with American Muslim communities, thus jeopardizing the broader counterterrorism 
agenda.  
Law enforcement and community leaders, as well as security ex-
perts, have proposed community policing by local law enforce-
ment personnel as the solution to this deteriorating relation-
ship.206 Community policing measures recommended include 
regular communication between local law enforcement officers 
and American Muslim communities, the creation of community 
liaison positions, increased cultural sensitivity training for law 
enforcement personnel (including front line personnel such as 
patrol officers), greater recruitment of American Muslims into 
law enforcement positions, and mechanisms for overcoming 
language barriers.207
While community policing has great potential to improve the fractured relationship between American Muslims 
and law enforcement agencies, it is unlikely to be effective without a repudiation of the biases reflected in the “re-
ligious conveyor belt” model and a move away from untargeted intelligence gathering as the primary response to 
the perceived threat of radicalization. As DHS’s advisors on countering violent extremism have recognized, “com-
munity policing can be impeded if other enforcement tactics involving a community are perceived as conflicting 
with community partnership efforts.”208  
To take account of the negative ramifications of current tactics, and to allow community policing to work, it is 
critical that our government’s response be recalibrated in several ways.
First, the federal government should clearly enunciate, through official public statements, that the “religious 
conveyor belt” model of radicalization does not bear the government’s imprimatur, whether implicit or explicit. 
DHS, the lead agency on radicalization, would be an appropriate agency to take this initial step.209
   
Second, the government should establish a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of the plethora of anti-
radicalization measures that have been implemented and whether they may be working at cross-purposes. Such a 
mechanism should, for example, assess whether our broader counterterrorism agenda is served by a surveillance-
heavy response to radicalization. The ODNI would be a logical choice to perform this evaluation. Its statutory 
V.
The government should establish 
a mechanism for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the plethora of  
anti-radicalization measures that  
have been implemented and  
whether they may be working at  
cross-purposes.
30 | Brennan center For JUStice
mandate to coordinate the efforts of the Intelligence Community gives it authority to conduct such a review.210 
Indeed, the broad strategic role envisioned for the ODNI means that it should be considering whether current 
anti-radicalization tactics are furthering our overall counterterrorism agenda. The office’s recently announced role 
of “coordinating an interagency planning effort to address domestic radicalization” would provide an appropriate 
platform for this type of analysis.211  The ODNI also has the expertise to make such an evaluation, because of both 
its intelligence know-how and its specific expertise on radicalization.212  
Third, the government should undertake an accounting of the civil liberties impact of a surveillance-heavy coun-
ter-radicalization policy, particularly on American Muslims’ First Amendment freedoms. A long line of First 
Amendment cases recognizes that “government information gathering through surveillance, subpoenas, question-
ing, and other techniques can chill freedom of speech, consumption of ideas, association, and other rights.”213 
While the FBI’s Inspector General recently released a report documenting infiltration of religious and political 
groups, including anti-war and environmentalist activists, no such reckoning has been initiated on behalf of 
American Muslims. Such an accounting should cover not only instances where the FBI may have overstepped the 
fairly weak restrictions on its infiltration of American Muslim spaces, but also the effect of such actions on First 
Amendment rights.214  
An ideal candidate to conduct this evaluation would be the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Based on 
the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation, Congress first created the Board within the White House.215  It was re-
structured in 2007 as an independent entity with subpoena powers.216 The mandate of the Board is to ensure that 
privacy and civil liberties concerns are appropriately considered in the implementation of all laws, regulations, 
and executive branch policies related to counterterrorism. However, despite the insistent urging of civil rights 
groups and the chair and vice-chair of the 9/11 Commission,217 President Obama has thus far named only two 
members to the Board, which is insufficient to allow it to function. The Board should be constituted as a matter 
of priority and should include representation from American Muslim communities.  It should consider the full 
range of issues relating to the appropriate role for government in countering radicalization, including the impact 
of untargeted intelligence collection and of sending informants into religious and political spaces.
Fourth, in order to allow an appropriate assessment of their effectiveness and impact on First Amendment pro-
tected activity, law enforcement policies in this area should be more transparent.  Thus far, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) has disclosed critical documents, such as the DIOG, only in the face of litigation pressure, and 
even then not in their entirety.218 The key portions of the DIOG detailing the guidance provided to FBI agents 
for initiating surveillance of religious and political institutions remain secret.  That should be remedied forthwith. 
Similarly, the DOJ should make public information sought by civil rights groups regarding how the FBI collects 
and uses demographic information about ethnic communities.219 And state and local law enforcement agencies 
should make their own intelligence gathering policies public, as there is currently very little official information 
available about them.
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Finally, the federal government should reconsider its outreach activities to ensure they are effective. Community 
outreach necessarily involves intensive and sustained communication between law enforcement officers and those 
they protect. Decades of research show that this type of outreach is best conducted by law enforcement personnel 
who are part of, and accountable to, the community. It is unclear that the FBI’s outreach activities contribute 
significantly to the goal of building trust with American Muslim communities; indeed, there are indications that 
they may even be counterproductive insofar as they are used to gather information about community members’ 
religious behaviors and beliefs. For the time being, the resources devoted to this effort may be better utilized in 
1) developing a meaningful national dialogue with representatives of American Muslim communities to address 
their grievances at the appropriate level, and 2) supporting local efforts at engagement.220   
The ultimate goal of these proposed measures is to improve our response to radicalization by bringing greater 
rationality and transparency to the effort. By explicitly articulating what we do and do not know about radicaliza-
tion, and by evaluating government policies in light of this knowledge, we can ensure that ineffective, counterpro-
ductive, or rights-violating policies are discontinued. This type of scrutiny will promote both the efficacy of our 
government’s counter-radicalization measures and their adherence to our fundamental values.
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